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Comment
SHOULD UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS BE ELIGIBLE
FOR RESIDENT TUITION STATUS AT STATE
UNIVERSITIES?
Eligibility for resident tuition status at state colleges and universi-
ties is generally reserved for lawful residents and citizens only.
This Comment analyzes this policy under equal protection doc-
trine to determine if it unjustifiably discriminates against undocu-
mented alien students.
INTRODUCTION
A permanent underclass of undocumented aliens reside in the
United States." Ineffective federal immigration policies and Ameri-
can employers' desire for inexpensive labor sustain its continued exis-
tence.2 Contrary to the popular image of undocumented aliens as
transient workers, a substantial number of undocumented families
have lived in the United States for many years,3 becoming Ameri-
1. See STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
POLICY, UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 477 (Apr.
30, 1981).
2. See Kincaid, Alternative Outcomes of Reform, 22 Soc. ScI. & MOD. SoC'Y
73, 73 (1985).
3. Research studies of resident undocumented aliens in interior areas show far
longer lengths of stay than aliens apprehended in border areas. Of the undocumented
Mexican male migrants apprehended within 25 miles of the southern border in 1979,
only seven percent had been in this country for more than six months. On the other hand,
a study of unapprehended undocumented aliens interviewed at an immigration counseling
center revealed that over 50% had been in the United States for more than three years.
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cans in every sense except for their legal status. They have been
encouraged to remain in the United States by employers and govern-
ment agencies that deliberately overlook their immigration status.5
The undocumented alien population, however, remains largely
outside the political system. Consequently, laws and policies aimed
at this group must be carefully scrutinized.6
This Comment addresses the eligibility rules governing resident
tuition status at state universities, focusing on the limitations of the
rules and their effect on the undocumented alien population in the
United States. Because the discriminatory impact which these rules
have on undocumented aliens fails to promote a substantial govern-
mental interest, they violate constitutional equal protection.7
THE ELIGIBILITY RULES AT STATE UNIVERSITIES
State universities generally charge higher tuition fees to nonresi-
dent students." The difference between resident and nonresident tui-
tion reflects the notion that state universities should be more accessi-
ble to those who have contributed to the education system through
the tax structure.9 While out-of-state residents are encouraged to at-
tend these institutions, they are not subsidized by state tax revenue;
consequently, they must bear the burden of most college education
In a study conducted in Orange County, California, researchers discovered that 19% of
the aliens interviewed had been living in this country for more than 10 years. See STAFF
REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, supra note 1,
at 503-04.
4. For example, the Valenzuela family crossed the border years ago and has
lived in the United States for 10 years. They own a growing used-tire shop and two cars.
They rent a tidy, three-bedroom home in Los Angeles' San Fernando Valley. Their four
children maintain B averages in public schools. They pay Social Security and income
taxes and keep a clean credit rating. All the family lacks is legal status. See Goodgame,
Citizens in All But Name, TIME, July 8, 1985, at 56.
5. For example, Mr. Valenzuela obtained a permit to sell used tires from a local
policeman who knew that the Valenzuelas were illegal immigrants. The police explained
that they do not inquire about the status of undocumented aliens to encourage these
aliens to come forward if they become victims of crime. Both Mr. and Mrs. Valenzuela
secured California drivers' licenses by showing their Mexican birth certificates and by
passing a driving test and a written examination in Spanish. When the Valenzuelas regis-
tered their cars, they needed no immigration documents. The same was true when they
borrowed money from a major California bank. Also, the Valenzuela children were en-
rolled in Los Angeles public schools without inquiry into their immigration status. See id.
6. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
7. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. See Education Comm'n of the States, Survey, 6 HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE
STATES 125, 125-39 (1978) (a complete survey of state regulations affecting resident/
nonresident status); Hellmuth, Residency for Tuition Purposes: A Study of the Rules in
Use at the Fifty State Universities (1981) (Ph.D. thesis, U. Wis. at Madison, available
from University Microfilms Int'l, P.O. Box 1346, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48106).
9. Hellmuth, supra note 8, at 5. The Supreme Court recognized that a state has
a "legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its own bona fide resi-
dents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis." Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441, 452-53 (1973).
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expenses themselves.1"
General uniformity exists among states' rules regarding resident
tuition status.1 Most rely on the concept of domicile-the intent to
establish and maintain a permanent home-to determine whether a
student is a state resident for tuition purposes. 2 However, due to the
subjective nature of "domicile," states generally employ objective
criteria to identify such intent.'$ While these criteria vary among
states, a one-year residency requirement is imposed in all but six
states.' 4 Other commonly employed indicia of domicile include place
of voter registration, motor vehicle registration, state income tax
payment, driver licensing, real property ownership, employment,
non-session residence, and source of support.' 5 No state has an all
inclusive list which automatically confers resident tuition status.' 6
Rather, these criteria serve merely as factors considered in making
such a determination.'1
10. Hellmuth, supra note 8, at 5.
11. Id. The residency rules at a majority of the state universities are developed
under the authority of the governing board of the university. State legislatures, however,
develop tuition statutes in 15 states, and higher education coordination boards formulate
the regulations in five other states. Two states use combinations of definitive statutory
law and policies developed by coordinating boards or regents. At Louisiana State Univer-
sity a memorandum of the President formulates the regulations, and at Pennsylvania
State University, the Auditor General of the state develops them. Id. at 35-38.
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (5th ed. 1979) defines domicile as "that place
where a man has his true, fixed and permanent home and principal establishment, and to
which whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning." The difference between
"domicile" and "residence" is clearly distinguished in that "domicile is the home, the
fixed place of habitation; while residence is a transient place of dwelling."
Although the definition of domicile is distinguishable from the definition of residence,
state universities use both terms to mean the same thing. Whether the term used is domi-
cile, legal residence, bona fide residence, in-state residence or residency for tuition pur-
poses, it is clear that the basis of residency in every state university is synonymous with
the legal definition of domicile in the sense of a person's permanent home. Hellmuth,
supra note 8, at.11.
13. See Hellmuth, supra note 8, at 38.
14. See id. at 36-37. See also HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE STATES, supra note 8.
In Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 452, the Supreme Court recognized that the states have the right
to impose a reasonable durational residency requirement on a student as one element in
demonstrating bona fide residence.
15. Hellmuth, supra note 8, at 47. The Supreme Court has looked favorably upon
such residency traits as being an aid in reaching residency determinations. See Viandis,
412 U.S. at 453-54.
16. Hellmuth, supra note 8, at 38.
17. See id. at 47-53. Each of the traits is an attempt to ascertain the establish-
ment of domicile, and therefore, residency for tuition purposes, by inference from certain
actions taken by the student within the state and local community of the university.
Some factors or actions may imply allegiance to a particular state and lend more credi-
bility to a student's claim; others may appear to have been taken for convenience or legal
reasons. For example, the payment of state income taxes in the state in which the univer-
As a prerequisite to being considered for resident tuition status
under these objective criteria, applicants must first be "eligible.","
Thirty-two states have special eligibility rules for aliens.19 These
rules generally preclude eligibility where the visa requires that the
alien maintain domicile in the country of origin.20 If the alien appli-
cant is not required to maintain domicile in the country of origin, the
alien is generally "eligible" to pursue a residency claim.21 However,
the majority of aliens enrolled at state universities are students on F
visas which require the alien to maintain domicile in the country of
22origin.
The United States Supreme Court, in deciding Toll v. Moreno,2 3
invalidated the University of Maryland's policy of denying resident
tuition status to G-4 visa holders-those officers and employees of
various international organizations who, together with their immedi-
ate families, are permitted to enter the country and establish domi-
cile in the United States.24 The Court held that, given congressional
policy which allows G-4 aliens to acquire domicile in the United
States, Maryland's policy of denying resident tuition status to G-4
aliens solely on the basis of the alien's federal immigration status
was a "burden not contemplated by Congress in admitting these
aliens to the United States."25 This holding, however, left intact the
sity is located and the avoidance of a more attractive financial option available in another
state is usually more persuasive than a local voting record or a driver's license. Because
of student appeal for local politics and shortened residency requirements for voting, many
students vote in local elections with little thought given to the notion that the voter's
permanent home is in the district. In addition, some states require driver licensing if the
driver operates a motor vehicle in the state for more than a short time period.
18. Most states have special rules pertaining to minors, students who marry a
state resident, military personnel, and aliens. These special rules delineate which students
in these groups are allowed to demonstrate "domicile" by meeting the indicia of resi-
dency set forth in the rules. See id. at 53-61. See also HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE
STATES, supra note 8.
19. Hellmuth, supra note 8, at 60. See also HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE STATES,
supra note 8. According to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503
(1982), originally enacted as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 82-
414, 66 Stat. 163, an "alien" is defined as "any person not a citizen or national of the
United States." Id. § 1101(a)(3). Two classes of aliens exist under the Act: immigrant
and nonimmigrant aliens. Immigrant aliens are those admitted for permanent residence.
Id. § 1151(a). Nonimmigrant aliens are those generally admitted only for temporary
periods and include students, tourists, diplomats and temporary workers. Id. §
1 101(a)(15). In addition, aliens may be admitted under the parole power of the Attorney
General. Id. § 1182(d)(5).
20. Hellmuth, supra note 8, at 60.
21. Id.
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F) (1982).
23. 458 U.S. 1 (1980).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(G)(iv) (1982).
25. 458 U.S. at 13-14. In reaching its decision in regard to the ability of G-4 visa
holders and their dependents to establish domicile in the United States, the Court relied
upon its prior decision in similar litigation, Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978). In
Elkins, the Court noted that Congress had specifically provided that some nonimmigrant
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alien eligibility rules applicable to all other visa holders, including
those holding F visas.
Undocumented aliens do not possess visas at all; they enter the
United States illegally without documentation.26 Consequently, they
are unable to demonstrate domicile as required under the alien eligi-
bility rules.27 Because these rules are the exclusive means by which
aliens are able to achieve eligibility,2 undocumented aliens are una-
ble to acquire resident tuition status.
This policy was recently challenged in California. Prior to 1983,
California law allowed only those immigrants who were lawfully ad-
mitted to the United States for permanent residency to apply for
resident tuition status.29 Consequently, nonimmigrant aliens, 0 al-
though lawfully admitted, were ineligible to apply."1 This policy was
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Toll v. Moreno,
since the policy denied G-4 visa holders eligibility.a2 As a result, Cal-
ifornia amended its law33 to allow all aliens to apply for resident
tuition status unless expressly precluded from doing so by the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act.3
While this amendment clearly allowed G-4 visa holders to apply
for resident tuition status, it was interpreted by California's universi-
ties and colleges to also allow undocumented aliens to apply for resi-
dent tuition status.35 Proponents of this position reasoned that the
aliens were admitted on the condition that they did not intend to abandon their foreign
residence, e.g., visitors to the United States, students, aliens in transit, vessel crewmen
landing temporarily, and temporary workers having a foreign country residence. Accord-
ingly, such nonimmigrants could not establish domicile in the United States, absent an
adjustment of status. From such specific provisions, the Court implied that other nonim-
migrant aliens, such as G-4 visa holders, were capable of becoming domiciliaries of a
state. Id. at 665-68.
26. Undocumented aliens are immigrants who have entered the United States in
a surreptitious manner. According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
they are classified as persons who have "entered without inspection" (EWIs). They are
"undocumented." Briggs, Methods of Analysis of Illegal Immigration into the United
States, 18 INT'L MIGRATION REV., 623, 623-24 (1984).
27. The rules provide that only aliens with certain types of visas can apply for
resident tuition status. See Hellmuth, supra note 8, at 60. See also supra text accompa-
nying notes 20-22.
28. See Hellmuth, supra note 8, at 60.
29. 67 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. 241, 242 (1984).
30. See supra note 19.
31. 67 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. at 243.
32. See id. at 243-46.
33. See id. at 242, 247.
34. Id. at 242; 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1153 (1982).
35. See Scott-Blair, Tuition Controversy Has Aliens in a Trap, San Diego Union,
Oct. 1, 1984, at BI, col. 1.
residency laws no longer required aliens to have been "'lawfully ad-
mitted," and nothing in the Immigration and Nationality Act ex-
pressly precludes undocumented aliens from establishing domicile.36
They further argued that, under prevailing case law, undocumented
aliens may establish a domicile of their choice.3 7 In Plyler v. Doe,38
the Supreme Court held that "illegal entry into the country would
not, under traditional criteria, bar a person from obtaining domicile
within a state."39
Rejecting these arguments, however, the California State Attor-
ney General, in a formal opinion, refused to follow the interpretation
of California universities and colleges 40 and ordered undocumented
aliens to pay nonresident tuition.4" In response, five undocumented
aliens filed suit against the University of California and California
State University challenging this policy on constitutional equal pro-
tection grounds.42 The Superior Court of Alameda County held that
the state attorney general's policy of precluding undocumented aliens
from eligibility to apply for resident tuition status was unconstitu-
tional.43 State officials did not appeal this ruling.44
The differential between resident and nonresident tuition already
exceeds $3000 per year at some state universities.45 Although the
eligibility rules in other states have yet to be challenged, the continu-
ing tuition increases seen each year make future opposition likely.
Undocumented aliens tend to be economically disadvantaged;46
thus, their attendance at state universities often depends upon their
ability to attain resident tuition status.47 In addition, the number of
36. 67 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. at 243.
37. Id.
38. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
39. Id. at 227 n.22.
40. 67 Cal. Att'y Gen. Op. at 243-47.
41. Id. at 247.
42. See Scott-Blair, supra note 35.
43. Leticia "A" v. Regents, No. 588-982-5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1985).
44. See Savage, State's Campuses Will Admit Illegal Aliens as Residents, L.A.
Times (San Diego ed.), July 24, 1985, § 1, at 3, col. 2.
45. According to a 1975-1976 study, the highest differential between resident and
nonresident tuition is at the University of Vermont (a differential of $3660 per year). At
19 state universities the differential is over $2000 per year, at 16 universities the differen-
tial is over $1500 per year, and at 11 universities the differential is over $1000 per year.
Four state universities did not differentiate between residents and nonresidents in the
amount of tuition charged. See Hellmuth, supra note 8, at 62-63.
46. All studies of undocumented aliens have noted their low and uncertain pay.
Bean, Browning & Frisbie, The Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Mexican Im-
migrant Status Groups: Implications for Studying Undocumented Mexicans, 18 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. 672, 687 (1984).
47. For a discussion of the dependency of minority and working class students on
low college tuition, see Am. Ass'N OF COMMUNITY AND JUNIOR COLLEGES & AM. ASS'N
OF STATE COLLEGES AND UNIVS. & NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE UNIVS. AND LAND GRANT
COLLEGES, Low TUITION FACTBOOK: EIGHT BASIC FACTS ABOUT TUITION AND EDUC.
OPPORTUNITY 11-13 (1983).
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undocumented aliens seeking admission to state universities is likely
to increase. The undocumented population is predominantly young,48
and most children of undocumented aliens have yet to reach college
age. The group now applying for college represents the vanguard of
undocumented aliens advancing through the public school system.
In reviewing the eligibility rules for resident tuition status at state
universities, courts must decide whether the preferential treatment
afforded lawful permanent residents and citizens49 over undocu-
mented aliens is constitutionally permissible.
EQUAL PROTECTION
General Rules
The United States Constitution guarantees "any person" within
the jurisidiction of the United States equal protection of the laws.5 0
Neither a state nor the federal government may enact laws which
discriminate against any discrete group or classification of people,
including aliens,52 without adequate justification. Although govern-
ment-imposed classifications are not prohibited per se under consti-
tutional equal protection guarantees,5 3 such classifications must sup-
port a state interest.
Laws challenged on the basis of constitutional equal protection are
reviewed by courts under varying standards, depending upon the na-
ture of the classification, the rights involved, and countervailing con-
48. See A. PORTES & R. BACH, LATIN JOURNEY 127 (1985).
49. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 221 (5th Ed. 1979), referring to the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution, defines a citizen as:
One who, under the constitution and laws of the United States, or of a particu-
lar state, is a member of the political community, owing allegiance and being
entitled to the enjoyment of full civil rights. All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside.
Lawful permanent residents are immigrants, not yet citizens of the United States, who
have been admitted under the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. §§
1101-1503 (1982), for permanent residence. See also supra note 19.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
51. While the fourteenth amendment explicitly imposes this mandate on the
states, the due process clause of the fifth amendment has been interpreted to include a
similar mandate for the federal government. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976).
52. Since the equal protection clause refers to "persons" and not "citizens," any
alien, regardless of the legality or illegality of his immigration status, is entitled to consti-
tutional protection from discrimination if he is physically present within the jurisdiction
of the United States. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
53. See, e.g., Mathews, 426 U.S. at 78 (alienage-based distinctions in federal wel-
fare programs upheld under minimal scrutiny).
stitutional concerns. "Minimal scrutiny" is generally the standard
used to review those laws whose classifications neither affect a "sus-
pect class" nor infringe upon "fundamental rights." 4 However,
when a classification either affects a suspect class 55 or infringes upon
a fundamental right, 56 courts generally apply "strict scrutiny."
Under this standard of review, the legislative purpose of the classifi-
cation must be "compelling." 57 Furthermore, the classification must
be closely related to that purpose and necessary to its achievement.,
In more recent decisions, the Supreme Court has also developed
"intermediate" standards of review.59 Different intermediate stan-
dards have been applied to various classifications, which, although
not "suspect," are nevertheless sufficiently invidious to warrant
"heightened scrutiny. '60 The Court has yet to clarify whether these
intermediate standards of review are triggered by the nature of the
classification, the right protected, or a combination of both.61 Al-
though these parameters remain relatively unidentified6 2 it is clear
that the state interest involved falls somewhere between the deferen-
tial minimal scrutiny and the strict scrutiny standard of review.
Classifications which fall within this intermediate area must gener-
ally be "substantially related to a legitimate state goal" to survive
constitutional equal protection challenge.63
Despite the differences in judicial review standards, the essence of
equal protection claims remains constant: equal protection under the
law is denied whenever the discriminatory impact of a classification
does not advance a state interest, and/or is the product of improper
54. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (minimal scrutiny
applies since welfare is not a fundamental right).
55. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race; antimiscegenation
laws).
56. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (right to interstate
travel).
57. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 193 (1964) (even if preserv-
ing "sexual decency" is a legitimate state interest, it is not "essential to punish promiscu-
ity of one racial group and not another").
58. Note, A Dual Standard for State Discrimination Against Aliens, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 1516, 1519 (1979).
59. The Supreme Court has employed intermediate review primarily in gender-
based discrimination cases, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and in cases
involving discrimination against illegitimate children, see, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S.
259 (1978). The Court reserved the question of whether mentally ill persons are a sus-
pect or semi-suspect class in Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 231 n.13 (1981), but
some lower federal courts have specifically discussed the issue. Compare Doe v. Colautti,
592 F.2d 704, 710-12 (3d Cir. 1979) (mentally ill not a suspect class) with Cleburne
Living Center v. City of Cleburne, Tex., 726 F.2d 191, 196-200 (5th Cir. 1984) (men-
tally retarded persons a quasi-suspect class).
60. See Note, supra note 58.
61. See Lines, Tuition Discrimination: Valid and Invalid Uses of Tuition Differ-
entials, 9 J. C. & U. L. 241, 244 (1982).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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motives.8 4 Where suspect and invidious classifications and fundamen-
tal rights are not affected, minimal scrutiny is employed as a matter
of deference to legislative decisionmaking 5 and state sovereignty
under notions of federalism. 68 Consequently, when minimal review is
applied, the courts often consider purposes not actually advanced by
the legislature, often rationalizing a nexus between the challenged
classification and any conceivable legislative purpose. 7 Conversely,
when suspect groups or fundamental rights are involved, courts are
often unwilling to validate the expressly stated legislative purposes
and facts offered to justify the challenged classification scheme.e8
In any challenge, the judicial test employed generally determines
the outcome of the case . 9 The vast majority of statutes survive con-
stitutional challenge when minimal scrutiny is employed;70 few sur-
vive strict scrutiny.71
The Appropriate Standard
Aliens were first recognized as a suspect class in Graham v. Rich-
ardson.7 2 The Court in Graham held that states may not condition
receipt of state-funded public assistance on citizenship or long term
residence without violating the equal protection clause.73 The Court
noted that aliens are a "prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
minority," and determined that state classifications74 based on alien-
64. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 993-94 (1978).
65. Id. at 995-96.
66. See infra note 74 for an explanation of the dual standard approach between
federal and state classifications regarding alienage.
67. See Note, supra note 58.
68. See id. at 1519-20.
69. Lines, supra note 61, at 244.
70. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 53-54. Under minimal review, these classifi-
cations were upheld. See also Lines, supra note 61, at 244.
71. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 1. Under strict scrutiny, this classification was struck
down. See also Lines, supra note 61, at 244-45. Compare Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (held unconstitutional to deny admittance into all-female
nursing school on the basis of gender) with Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1971)
(held constitutional a social security provision that provided higher monthly old-age ben-
efits for retired female wage earners than for males). See also Lines, supra note 61, at
244.
72. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
73. Id. at 365.
74. The states' power to classify on the basis of alienage is considerably more
limited than the power vested in the federal government. Although the Court requires the
states to demonstrate a compelling interest for their alienage classifications, the federal
government is required only to demonstrate a rational basis for its alienage classifica-
tions. Some commentators have attributed this dual standard approach for alienage clas-
sifications as a reflection of the extraordinary judicial deference given to the federal gov-
age are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.75
Under Graham, states cannot discriminate against lawfully admit-
ted aliens.76 The constitutionality of excluding undocumented aliens,
however, is far less certain. In Plyler v. Doe, 77 a Texas statute deny-
ing educational benefits to the minor children of undocumented
aliens was challenged as unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds. The Supreme Court held that undocumented aliens are not
a suspect class since they are members of the class through their own
volition and in violation of federal immigration laws.78 While the
Plyler court was unwilling to characterize undocumented aliens as a
suspect class, it nevertheless found they were a "disfavored group. '7 9
This characterization is consistent with the Court's traditional view
that suspect classes are those composed of the politically helpless
who require protection from the majoritarian political process.8 0 Un-
documented aliens are likely to remain outside the political system
not only because they are members of a minority immigrant group,
but because they fear detection81 and are generally passive recipients
of government policies aimed at them.8 2 Consequently, the status of
the undocumented alien population as an underclass in American so-
ciety is likely to remain unchanged. 8
A suspect class was not involved in Plyler; thus, the Court was left
with a fundamental right as the only basis upon which it could apply
strict scrutiny in reviewing the Texas law. Education has not quali-
fied as a fundamental right;84 however, the Court has distinguished
education from other optional benefits which serve to elevate the sta-
ernment's power to define the national community. The federal government's interest in
emphasizing the difference between citizens and aliens-for example, giving preference
to citizens in order to encourage aliens to naturalize and thus join the national commu-
nity-is generally deemed compelling. See, e.g., Schuck, The Transformation of Immi-
gration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 24 (1984).
75. 403 U.S. at 372.
76. Id.
77. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
78. Id. at 219 n.19.
79. See id. at 222.
80. See, e.g., Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
81. Briggs, supra note 26, at 625; M. GARCIA Y GRIEGO, THE BORDER THAT
JOINs 43 (P. Brown & H. Shue trans. 1981).
82. See M. GARCIA Y GRIEGO, supra note 81, at 43. The author states that be-
cause undocumented aliens fear detection, they are often reluctant to seek legal remedies
for wrongs done them, or to apply for welfare services. As a result, they are in a position
to be exploited, robbed and blackmailed. The erosion of undocumented aliens' human
rights is unavoidable when there is no contact with government agencies. See also A.
PORTES & R. BACH, supra note 48, at 344-45, for a discussion of how immigrants in
general have been passive recipients of government policies toward them. Despite their
presentation as benign, these policies have been guided by theoretical orthodoxy, the ten-
ets of which have proved empirically wrong.
83. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218-19.
84. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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tus of the poor.8 5 The Court has viewed education as vital to our
democratic system; its denial generates cumulative injuries which
have an effect similar to electoral barriers.8 6 Denying education ad-
versely effects not only our democratic system, but also individuals
who are permanently stigmatized by illiteracy.8 7
In Plyler, the Supreme Court implied both that education is a
quasi-fundamental right and that undocumented aliens comprise a
semi-suspect class.88 However, Justice Brennan, writing the majority
opinion in Plyler, stated that "more is involved in this case than the
abstract question whether [the statute] discriminates against a sus-
pect class, or whether education is a fundamental right." 89 Because
the statute imposed a "lifetime of hardship on a discrete class of
children not accountable for their disabling status," the Court con-
cluded that the discriminatory treatment had to be justified by a
substantial state interest.90
Plyler seems to focus on the legal "innocence""' of the undocu-
mented children. While heightened scrutiny could not be invoked on
"innocence" alone, 92 characterization of undocumented aliens as a
"disfavored group" seems to provide the colorable claim of discrimi-
nation necessary to warrant its application.
The heightened scrutiny employed in Plyler finds support in the
Court's decisions involving classifications based on illegitimacy.93 In
these cases, the Supreme Court has relied on the notion that soci-
ety's condemnation of illegitimacy should not be imposed upon chil-
dren who have no responsibility for and no control over their illegiti-
mate status.94 The Court has recognized that "imposing disabilities
85. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
86. See id. at 233-34 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
87. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 79 and 85.
89. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
90. See id. at 223-24.
91. See id. at 244-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The Court seemed to assume that undocumented alien children could not be prose-
cuted under 8 U.S.C. § 1325, which prohibits an alien's entry into the United States by
fraud or without authority of an immigration officer. Even though deportable, the chil-
dren were "innocent" under traditional concepts. The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96
HARV. L. REV. 62, 133 n.29 (1982-83).
92. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The equal protection
clause does not "eradicate every distinction for which persons are not 'responsible.'"
93. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1970); Lalli v. Lalli, 439
U.S. 259 (1978).
94. Although illegitimate children are not a suspect class, illegitimacy classifica-
tions must be rejected "if they are not substantially related to permissible state inter-
ests." Lalli, 439 U.S. at 265.
on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our sys-
tem that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing. '9 5
The Court has generally required a substantial state interest in
illegitimacy-discrimination cases even when only economic benefits
are at stake.96 This is true of gender-based discrimination cases as
well. 7 By requiring a "substantial state interest" in these cases de-
spite the absence of an "important" benefit such as education,98 the
Court implicitly considers both illegitimacy and gender as more sus-
pect than undocumented alien status. However, Justice Powell sug-
gests, in his concurring opinion in Plyler, that the Court's decision
would also apply to welfare benefit cases, stating: "[i]f the resident
children of illegal aliens were denied welfare assistance, made avail-
able by the government to all other children who qualify, this
also-in my opinion-would be an impermissible penalizing of chil-
dren because of their parents' status." 99
The California Supreme Court applied the Plyler rationale to
strike down a state policy which discriminated against children of
undocumented aliens by limiting the amount of AFDC ° ° funds they
could receive.101 Like the children in Plyler, these children were "in-
nocent" with respect to their undocumented status.0 2 The chal-
lenged classification deprived eligible citizen children of benefits
based upon the status of their undocumented parents.103 Similarly, a
federal district court decision held that New York state could not
victimize citizen children or lawful resident children by depriving
them of day care services based solely upon the mother's undocu-
mented status.0
95. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
96. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org.
v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972).
97. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
99. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239 n.3.
100. Aid to Families With Dependent Children.
101. Darces v. Wood, 35 Cal. 3d 871, 679 P.2d 458, 201 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1984).
The State Department of Social Services (DES), pursuant to its duty to implement the
AFDC program in California, established the policy that the family budget unit would
be limited to citizens, lawful permanent residents, and aliens residing in the United
States "under color of law." Therefore, undocumented aliens were excluded from the
family budget unit for purposes of determining the amount of the AFDC grant. Id. at
877 n.3, 679 P.2d at 462 n.3, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 811 n.3.
102. Id. at 892, 679 P.2d at 472, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
103. Id. at 888, 679 P.2d at 468, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
104. Ruiz v. Blum, 549 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The court rested its deci-
sion on the rationale that the denial of day care benefits based solely on the mother's
status was an impermissible condition inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the
Social Security Act provision that eligible children receive day care services. Id. at 877.
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The common underpinning of the above cases-that "innocent"
children are not to be held accountable for their status of birth-also
applies to resident tuition status eligibility rules which discriminate
against undocumented aliens. These eligibility rules affect young
adult students who bear no culpability for their parents' decision to
illegally immigrate to the United States. Most of the students now
applying for college have resided in the United States for many
years.10 5 They have attended public schools and are academically
qualified to attend state universities.10 6 Penalizing these "innocent"
students is a meaningless deterrent to the illegal immigration of their
parents0" and is unfair to the students themselves.
Under equal protection analysis, however, the eligibility rules for
resident tuition status must do more than discriminate against stu-
dents who bear no culpability for their "disabling" status to justify
the heightened scrutiny in judicial review. An unavoidable stigma-
tizing effect is also necessary.108 The undocumented status of these
alien students, combined with the effects resulting from a limited
education, results in such a stigma. Although the eligibility rules cre-
ate only an economic disadvantage in gaining access to state-spon-
sored education, they have the practical effect of denying a higher
education to undocumented aliens who are unable to pay the higher
out-of-state tuition. 109 Thus, the rules discriminate against a "disfa-
vored group" of definable "poor persons."' 10
While a "lifetime of hardship" ' 1 is more likely to result from a
lack of elementary and secondary education, the effects of denying
undocumented aliens a higher education are substantial in light of
the increasing importance of higher education in American society.
Dr. Benson, the expert witness in Leticia "A" v. Regents,"2 testified
that "a college education is as necessary to a young person living in
1984 as was a high school education fifty years ago."11 3 More than
105. See Scott-Blair, supra note 35. See also Scott-Blair, Five Reasons for Class
Action Against State School System, San Diego Union, Oct. 1, 1984, at B2, col. 1.
106. See Scott-Blair, supra note 35.
107. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
110. While the Supreme Court, in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 22, 35 (1973), rejected the idea that education is a fundamental right, it
seemed to reserve the question whether a total denial of education to an identifiable class
of resident children would require strict scrutiny.
111. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
112. No. 588-982-5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1985).
113. Id. at 10-11.
fifty percent of the college age population in California is now in
college, and employers are filling positions which have traditionally
required only a high school degree with college graduates. 1 4 People
who lack a higher education are more prone to be unemployed or to
earn low wages.1 15
Higher education benefits both the individual and society.," It
plays a vital role in providing a source of innovation and renewal in
today's technological world.1 17
The underrepresentation of Hispanics in institutions of higher
learning is a growing concern. 118 Due to the growing Hispanic popu-
lation, entire communities will increasingly depend upon Hispanics
for leadership in future years.119 Because the majority of undocu-
mented aliens are Hispanic,1 20 denying higher education to undocu-
mented aliens has increased significance.
On this basis, higher eduation for undocumented aliens is an "im-
portant" interest deserving heightened scrutiny when it is denied.
Courts should employ heightened scrutiny to review the constitution-
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. CARNEGIE COMM'N ON HIGHER EDUC., A DIGEST OF REPORTS OF THE CAR-
NEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION 195 (1974).
117. Id.
118. Payan, Peterson & Castille, Access to College for Mexican-Americans in the
Southwest: Replication After 10 Years 8-14 (1984). This survey conducted by the Col-
lege Entrance Examination Board reviews four major reports on the experience of Mexi-
can-Americans and Hispanics in American schools and colleges. See also Hispanic Stu-
dent Potential 'Wasted,' Says Study, HISPANIc LINK WEEKLY REPORT, Dec. 17, 1984,
at 1. This study reveals a 19% national Hispanic high school dropout rate (compared to
17% for blacks and 12.5% for whites). Few Hispanics who drop out of high school ever
return to school and even fewer ever enter college. J. Harrison & K. Pailthorp, Presenta-
tion of the California Postsecondary Education Commission to the University of Califor-
nia-Sponsored Conference on Educational Underachievement in Linguistic Minorities at
Granlibakken, Tahoe City (May 31, 1985) (available from the California Postsecondary
Education Commission, 1020 12th Street, Sacramento, CA 95814). It was revealed that
84.7% of the California public high school Hispanic graduates were ineligible for admis-
sion into either the California State University or the University of California. Only
10.4% were eligible for the California State University and only 4.9% were eligible for
the University of California.
119. Hispanic Student Potential 'Wasted,' Says Study, supra note 118, at 2.
120. Of the 2.06 million undocumented aliens estimated to have been counted in
the 1980 census, almost 55% of the total is from Mexico, and no other country group
(i.e., estimation area) accounts for even five percent of the total. Another large group of
undocumented immigrants (7.1%) comes from Cuba, the Dominican Republic and speci-
fied Caribbean countries (i.e., Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago). Another major
source area is Central America and the balance of the Caribbean (8.6%). See Passel &
Woodrow, Geographic Distribution of Undocumented Immigrants; Estimates of the Un-
documented Aliens Counted in the 1980 Census by State, 18 INT'L MIGRATION REV.
642, 651, 654 (1984).
Reports cited in the Payan, Peterson & Castille survey, supra note 118, revealed that
for Chicanos (Mexican-Americans): 55% graduate from high school (compared to 85%
of whites); 7% complete college (whites, 23%); 4% enter a postgraduate school; and 2%
complete graduate or professional school (whites, 8%).
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ality of resident tuition status eligibility rules under the equal protec-
tion doctrine; discriminatory treatment disfavoring undocumented
aliens should be justified by a substantial state interest to survive
constitutional challenge.
Applying Heightened Scrutiny
The eligibility rules for resident tuition status do not further a
substantial state purpose. The Court in Plyler, clearly rejected the
state's contention that justification for discrimination against un-
documented aliens need not be provided because the presence of un-
documented aliens in the United States is discouraged by federal
policy.121 After noting that the federal government has broad au-
thority to classify on the basis of alienage, the Court observed that:
"The state may borrow the federal classification. But to justify its
use as a criterion for its own discriminatory policy, the state must
demonstrate that the classification is reasonably adaptable to 'the
purposes for which the state desires to use it.' ",122
The right to higher education bears no relationship to the presence
of undocumented persons in the country. The Court, in Plyler, found
that undocumented aliens are not lured to the United States to ob-
tain public education for their children;1 23 they are certainly not
coming on the chance that they or their children will be admitted to
a state university with resident tuition status.
Similarly, the states' interest in preserving state treasury funds for
lawful residents and citizens is not substantial enough to justify a
discriminatory policy disfavoring undocumented aliens. Although
conserving financial resources is a sufficient justification for statutory
classifications under minimal scrutiny,124 it is not so in the area of
suspect and semi-suspect classifications.125
Classification schemes involving suspect and semi-suspect classes
generally cannot be justified on the basis of administrative conve-
nience. 126 When a statute conclusively denies benefits to one subclass
while at the same time grants the same benefits to another, courts
121. 457 U.S. at 224-26.
122. Id. at 226 (quoting Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 664-65 (1948)).
123. Id. at 228. Numerous studies show that the dominant motive for illegal immi-
gration is employment. See, e.g., Fogel, TWentieth-Century Mexican Migration to the
United States, in THE GATEWAY: US. IMMIGRATION ISSUES AND POLICIES 200 (B. Chis-
wick ed. 1982).
124. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
125. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 374-75 (1971).
126. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973).
will strike the statute down where its sole justification is based upon
administrative convenience. 127 However, when the classification
scheme is used merely as an indication of eligibility for a benefit,
administrative convenience is a sufficient justification.'2" Because the
eligibility rules of resident tuition status conclusively deny undocu-
mented aliens the opportunity to demonstrate domicile while lawful
residents and citizens are automatically eligible to apply, administra-
tive convenience cannot justify the classification of illegal aliens in
tuition status regulations.
Assuming that the state policy of restricting employment of un-
documented aliens is a proper legislative goal, 129 the focus then be-
comes the relevance of that legislative goal to the eligibility rules.
Higher education generally enhances employment opportunities. Yet
these rules which effectively deny a higher education to undocu-
mented aliens still leave undocumented aliens competing with lawful
residents and citizens for low paying jobs. In addition, many of to-
day's undocumented students will eventually become lawful citi-
zens"30 who will then be eligible for welfare' 31-a condition made
more likely by the eligibility rules.
Not only do the eligibility rules fail to serve an important state
interest, they are also inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the
rules themselves. Resident tuition rules are designed to preserve state
universities for those residents who have contributed to the educa-
tional system through the tax structure.3 2 This purpose is accom-
plished by requiring students to prove domicile.3 3 The rules presume
that undocumented aliens are transient people. Yet, available socio-
127. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (Texas law denying the right
of paternal support to illegitimate children while granting it to legitimate children vio-
lates equal protection).
128. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 511-16 (1976) (presumption of
dependency for the purpose of receiving survivor's benefits under the Social Security Act
was withheld from illegitimate children only in the absence of any significant indication
of the likelihood of actual dependency; equal protection not violated when justified by
administrative convenience). But cf. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688 (married woman in the
uniformed services seeking to obtain housing and medical benefits for her spouse must
prove his dependency in fact, whereas no such burden is imposed upon male members;
equal protection violated when justified by administrative convenience).
129. In De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld Cali-
fornia Labor Code § 2805(a) which prohibited an employer from knowingly employing
an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employment
would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers. The State's program reflected
Congress' intention of prohibiting employment of all aliens except those possessing a
grant of permission to work in this country. Id. at 361.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 136-38.
131. Nearly all the major federal social welfare programs are limited to citizens,
lawful permanent residents, and aliens residing in the United States "under color of
law." Jakes, Equal Protection for Aliens in Employment and Benefit Programs, 2 IMMI-
GRATION L. REP. 4, 174 (1983).
132. See supra text accompanying note 9.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
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economic studies of undocumented aliens indicate the contrary. The
undocumented alien population is composed of many settled nuclear
families134 who pay taxes and contribute to states' economies.' 35 Al-
though not every undocumented alien would qualify for resident tui-
tion status, the vast majority who apply would satisfy the indicia of
domicile set forth in the rules. Thus, automatic exclusion of all un-
documented aliens from eligibility for resident tuition status is, in
this sense, arbitrary and over-broad discrimination.
The eligibility rules also presume that undocumented aliens can-
not legalize their immigration status. Although undocumented aliens
are subject to deportation at any time, deportation is within the dis-
cretion of the Attorney General." 6 Moreover, it can take many years
before residency applications are finally processed by the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service.13 7 Many immigrants spend this
time, albeit unlawfully, within the United States.'3
In sum, state policies which bar undocumented aliens from estab-
lishing resident tuition status, even for those who have resided in the
state for many years and who intend to remain, fail to correspond in
a legally sufficient manner with any substantial state interest. The
eligibility rules governing the ability of undocumented aliens to ac-
quire resident tuition status are, therefore, unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Immigration reform has moved at a snail's pace in the United
States. As a result, inequities abound. Although the nation's policies
encourage the presence of undocumented aliens, those who have
lived in the United States for many years are still unable to take
advantage of many opportunities available to other residents. Lack-
ing representation in the political community in which they live,
their "disfavored" status as an underclass is self-perpetuating. Be-
134. See Weintraub, Illegal Immigrants in Texas: Impact on Social Services and
Related Considerations, 18 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 740, 745 (1984). See also Texas
Population Research Center, Paper No. 4.008, The Migration of Indocumentados as a
Settlement Process: Implications for Work 12-15 (1982). For statistics on lengths of
stays in the United States, see supra note 3, and for an example of a settled undocu-
mented alien nuclear family, see supra note 4.
135. A. BUSTAMENTE, MEXICAN IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 99
(1981). See also Golden, Study Shows Illegal Mexicans Pay Taxes, San Diego Union,
May 4, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
136. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1253(h), 1254 (1982).
137. See A. FRAGOMEN, A. DEL REY & S. BERNSEN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND Bus-
INESS 3-4 (1984).
138. See Briggs, supra note 26, at 624-25.
cause of this "disfavored" status, state policies discriminating
against undocumented aliens must be carefully scrutinized. One such
state policy is the eligibility rules for resident tuition status at state
universities which preclude undocumented aliens from acquiring res-
ident tuition status solely on the basis of their federal immigration
status.
Under equal protection analysis, the predicates for employing
heightened scrutiny are present in the state resident tuition eligibility
rules which discriminate against "innocent" undocumented alien stu-
dents who are not accountable for their "disabling status."
Although undocumented aliens do not reside in the United States
legally, young adult undocumented students bear no culpability for
this illegal activity. Yet these students are stigmatized by the eligi-
bility rules which effectively deny them the opportunity for higher
education, an injury enhanced by their "disfavored" status. Under
heightened scrutiny, the eligibility rules are unconstitutional; any
"substantial" state interest these rules could possibly support has yet
to be identified.
Many states have implicitly incorporated federal immigration laws
into their own state policies to prescribe resident tuition status eligi-
bility rules without any regard to the resulting effects on a group of
people who are in most cases domiciliaries of the state. The uncon-
troverted evidence shows that substantial numbers of undocumented
aliens have lived in the United States for many years and exhibit the
traditional characteristics of settled families. These families are simi-
lar in every respect to lawful residents except for their immigration
status. They contribute both to our national economy as well as our
tax base. The rules which automatically exclude undocumented
aliens from eligibility for resident tuition status at state universities
and colleges, a right granted to all other citizens, are arbitrary and
overinclusive. Since there is no identifiable justification for depriving
undocumented alien students the opportunity for higher education,
the resident tuition eligibility rules violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution.
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